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It is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase
acceptance even of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this con-
jecture in a three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which frac-
tion of the responder's endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder
decides which part of the endowment to destroy. Thus, the responder can
punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. We modify the game by
letting the responder participate in takers' transfer decision and consider the
eect of participation on the destruction rate. We nd that participation
matters. Responders destroy more if they (1) had no opportunity to par-
ticipate in the decision making process and (2) are confronted with highly
unfavorable outcomes. This participation eect is highly signicant for those
responders (the majority) who show negative reciprocity (i.e., destroy more
when takers are greedier).
JEL Classication: C72, C91, D72
Keywords: fairness, participatory decision making, power-to-take game,
procedural fairness, reciprocity1 Introduction
It is a common experience that people can get seriously annoyed if decisions
aecting them are taken `over their heads'. Reactions range from negative
comments over passive resistance to active resistance. From an economic
point of view, the interesting aspect is that it is often the perceived unfairness
of the decision procedure, and not so much the decision itself, which triggers
these negative reactions. This raises the question of whether a fair procedure,
and especially the involvement of the aected parties in the decision process,
may increase acceptance of decisions, especially unfavorable decisions.
A minimum requirement of procedural fairness1 seems to be that, if pos-
sible and feasible, the aected parties should be given a voice: they are to
be heard before the decision is made. This is also a cornerstone of most legal
systems. In accordance with the famous legal principle audiatur et altera
pars, judges are required to give a hearing to both sides in a dispute. In
many cases, people want more than just a voice; they want the possibility
of participation through, for instance, voting or vetoing. Again, legal pro-
cedures often contain such stronger representation rights, for instance, the
right to reject candidates for a jury. Depending on the decision in question,
then, procedural fairness requires representation of the aected parties in
the decision making process, where representation rights vary from voice to
1Economists mostly speak of procedural fairness, while psychologists and lawyers seem
to prefer procedural justice. We consider these expressions to be synonymous.
1participation.2
According to the homo oeconomicus approach, of course, the design of
decision procedures matters to the aected parties only through its eects
on outcomes. Specically, whether someone is granted representation rights
or not at an earlier stage of the decision process should, ceteris paribus, be
irrelevant for his behavior in the face of a given unfavorable decision at a
later stage.3 Recent work in behavioral economics and social psychology,
however, indicates that this is probably false. People seem to care not only
2We take these distinctions from the psychological literature on procedural fairness.
Leventhal (1980) distinguishes between six dierent procedural rules of fair processes:
representativeness, consistency, correctability, bias suppression, accuracy, and ethicality.
Representativeness can be subdivided into two aspects: participation and voice. Accord-
ing to Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo (1997), a process is considered fair if people
can participate in the process (participation) and are heard (voice); further criteria which
are met by fair decision making processes include adequate time for the process, adequate
information, respectful treatment, discussion of and dealing with issues, and lack of bias
by authorities. Tyler and Lind (2000: 67-77) add entitlement of authorities. We speak of
representation instead of representativeness, with voice (being heard) being the weakest
form and participation covering any stronger form of inuence. Note that voice is some-
times used in a stronger sense. Anand (2001: 249) denes voice as the extent to which
a person has control over a decision. Folger (1977) and Folger, Roseneld, Grove and
Corkran (1979) dene voice as the extent to which opinions and preferences of aected
parties are considered in the decision-making process.
3The ceteris paribus clause covers informational aspects: if the decision to exercise (or
not) representation rights reveals private information, this can aect the behavior of a
homo oeconomicus.
2about outcomes but also about the procedure through which an outcome is
achieved. They have procedural likes and dislikes, or procedural preferences,
which depend on the procedures' perceived fairness or unfairness.4
Procedural preferences not only inuence choices between procedures but,
more surprisingly, choices within procedures, specically, the choice to oer
resistance. The explanation for this eect seems to be the connection between
fairness perceptions and negative reciprocity observed in many experiments.
By negative reciprocity, we mean the adoption of a costly action that
harms another person because that person's intentional behavior was per-
ceived to be harmful to oneself.5 Of course, whenever people have to share
resources, taking something for oneself implies harming the others. How-
ever, this does not always trigger negatively reciprocal behavior. Typically,
negative reciprocity is caused by the perception of unfairness. In the ultima-
tum game, for instance, unfair proposals cause responders to reject positive
oers (G uth et al. 1982). Falk et al. (2008) have shown that proposers' in-
tentions matter in this respect: it seems that responders wish not (only) to
avoid unequal or unfair outcomes but (also) to punish intentionally unfair
proposers.
There is evidence that the fairness of the decision procedure itself also
inuences the degree of negative reciprocity. In a survey of forty independent
4On procedural preferences in general, see, e.g., Leventhal 1980, Lind and Tyler (1988),
Elster (1989), Tyler et al. (1997), Frey et al. (2004) and Bohnet (2006).
5See Cox and Deck (2005). Subsequently, however, we do not distinguish between
negative reciprocity as a motivation and negatively reciprocal behavior.
3studies, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) show that people are more satised
even with unfavorable outcomes if these outcomes have been accomplished
on a fair basis. Tyler and Lind (2000) found that people are more likely
to obey the commands of an authority if they regard the authority to be
entitled to their obedience. This holds irrespective of their judgements about
the authority's decision. Since entitlement is also an aspect of procedural
fairness, this indicates that people may be more likely to accept unfavorable
outcomes if the process leading to the outcome was fair (Tyler and Lind 1988,
Tyler 1990, Thibaut and Walker 1975).
In a review of the psychological literature, Konovsky (2000) emphasizes
the particular importance of procedural fairness in business organizations.
Procedural fairness evaluations inuence negative employee behaviors such
as theft (Greenberg, 1990), employees' job satisfaction and organizational
commitment (Lowe and Vodanovich, 1995), organizational change (Tyler and
De Cremer, 2005), and turnover intentions (Olkkonen and Lipponen, 2006).
The special importance of participation is emphasized by Frey et al.
(2004), who measure procedural utility by individuals' reported subjective
well-being or happiness, arguing that individuals gain procedural utility, in
addition to outcome utility, through actual participation or even the mere
possibility of participation. The same outcome may be evaluated dierently,
depending on whether it is a market outcome or the result of voting, bar-
gaining, or command. In particular, judgements of procedural fairness, for
instance, whether participation is allowed or denied, may have an impact on
4the acceptance of outcomes.
Despite the signicance ascribed to procedural fairness in the literature,
there are few experimental studies where participants' decisions have mone-
tary consequences. An important exception is Bolton et al. (2005), who show
that allocations resulting from unbiased random procedures, which are usu-
ally viewed as fair, are more readily accepted than the same allocations when
chosen by another person. Grimalda et al. (2007) address a question similar
to ours. In a three-person ultimatum game6, they vary the degree of par-
ticipation: in the non-participation treatment (our term), a decision maker
is selected randomly; in the participation treatment, every player makes a
proposal and one of the proposals is selected randomly. As the authors
emphasize, these two treatments are strategically equivalent. Perhaps not
surprisingly, then, they nd only weak evidence that participation makes
a dierence: after players have gained some experience, proposers seem to
demand less, and responders seem to concede less, in the participation treat-
ment, which might be due to an entitlement eect.
As far as we know, the experiment reported in this paper is the rst incen-
tivized experiment varying the degree of strategically relevant participation.
We modify Bosman and van Winden's (2002) power-to-take game, using
a setup with one responder and two takers. In the rst stage of this game,
the takers decide which fraction of the responder's endowment to transfer to
6With, it seems, monetary payos; however, Grimalda et al. (2007) do not mention the
exact values.
5themselves (the take rate). In the second stage, the responder decides which
part of the endowment to destroy (the destruction rate). Thus, the responder
can punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. In comparison to the
ultimatum game, the responder can vary the degree of rejection by destroying
only a part of her endowment. The game approximates social environments
characterized by appropriation, for instance, taxation, common agency, or
monopolistic selling (Bosman and van Winden, 2002).
We further modify the game by letting the responder participate in the
takers' decision and consider the eect on her choice of the destruction rate.
To study the impact of the degree of participation, we consider four dierent
versions of the rst-stage group decision making process. In all cases, the take
rate is determined as the weighted average of three simultaneous proposals,
two of which are made by the takers. The third proposal is made either by the
responder (participation treatment) or by a computerized dummy making a
random choice (no-participation treatment). While takers' proposals have
always equal weights, the weight of the responder's or dummy's proposal is
either equal to the weight of a taker's proposal (low-inuence treatment) or
twice as high (high-inuence treatment).
In contrast to previous studies based on the power-to-take game, we
use Selten's (1967) strategy method for responders' decisions on destruc-
tion rates, thus asking responders to choose destruction rates for all possible
take rates. This allows us to observe the extent of negative reciprocity shown
by a participant, that is, the extent to which participants choose higher de-
6struction rates as a response to higher take rates.7
It is well-known from many experiments that not all participants show
reciprocal behavior. Instead, participants fall into dierent categories called
player types. The following types have been observed in many experiments.8
Type 0 (homo oeconomicus): This type shows no reciprocity, behaving
instead just like the homo oeconomicus model predicts.
Type 1 (unconditional cooperator): This type also shows no reciprocity
but behaves cooperatively even in the face of non-cooperative behavior.
Type 2 (homo reciprocans): Also known as conditional cooperator. This
type shows reciprocity to various degrees.9
Type 3 (erratic): This type shows erratic behavior.
Given that the occurrence of these types is a well-known phenomenon,
an analysis of average behavior dierences between treatments is clearly in-
7It is plausible that the strategy method weakens the inuence of emotions on decision
making since participants consider their reactions to hypothetical, and not actual, choices
of other players (\cold", in contrast to \hot", settings, see Brandts and Charness 2000).
Evidence on the eect of applying the strategy method is mixed. Brandts and Charness
(2000) and Fischbacher and G achter (2006) do not nd a dierence between hot and cold
settings, whereas Brosig et al. (2003) do.
8See, e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001), Goeree et al. (2002), Kurzban and Houser (2005),
Burlando and Guala (2005), Fischbacher and G achter (2006), and Albert et al. (2007).
Although the discussion of agents' heterogeneity has a long history in economics, experi-
mental evidence on the existence of dierent player types is still very imperfect.
9See, e.g., Falk and Fischbacher (2006) for theories of reciprocity. Dohmen et al. (2006)
explore the prevalence of reciprocity in the population by analyzing survey data.
7sucient. A dierence in averages may be due to changes in the frequency
of dierent types, or due to changes of the behavior of the types. From the
literature reviewed above, no hypothesis concerning the frequency of dier-
ent types in dierent treatments emerges. Our hypothesis is that responder
types are given exogenously and that, therefore, any observed dierences in
frequency between treatments are due to chance. This seems to be the usual
hypothesis in the literature; it can, moreover, be tested.
This leaves changes in the behavior of types. By denition, type 0 and
type 1 behaviors, which in our experiment need not be dierent, cannot be
aected by our treatments.10 With respect to the erratic type, any inuence
is possible, but the literature contains no hypotheses, again more or less by
denition, since susceptibility to systematic inuences means that behavior
is only partially erratic.
In the case of type 2, homo reciprocans, which usually is the most frequent
type, a clear hypothesis emerges. If, as conjectured, participation is an aspect
of fairness, negative reciprocity should be less pronounced in the participation
treatments. Whether a higher inuence also increases the perceived fairness
of the decision procedure is an open question.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the experimental de-
10Actually, this is not quite correct. Types 0 and 1 both do not engage in negative
reciprocity. However, type 0 is indierent between all destruction rates when faced with a
take rate of 1. Strictly speaking, a treatment eect on indierent choices is not ruled out
by the homo oeconomicus model.




Participants play a three-person two-stage one-shot game. In each game,
there are two takers, also called player 1 and 2, and one responder, also called
player 3. The responder has an endowment e. Takers have no endowments.
In the rst stage, a take rate t 2 [0;1] is determined in a simultaneous move.
In the second stage, the responder chooses a destruction rate d 2 [0;1] in
response to the take rate determined in stage 1. The experimental payo to
each taker j = 1;2 is j = 0:5t(1   d)e as takers' total payo is equally split
among them. The responder's experimental payo is 3 = (1   t)(1   d)e.
Thus, the responder can punish the takers by destroying more or less of her
endowment. As long as t < 1, punishment is costly.
To study the impact of participation and strength of inuence, we consider
four dierent versions of the rst-stage group decision making process. In all
cases, the take rate is determined as the weighted average of three simulta-
neous proposals, two of which are made by the takers. The third proposal is
made either by the responder (participation treatment) or by a computerized
11Translations of the instructions and a post-experimental questionnaire are available
from the authors upon request.






dummy making a random choice (no-participation treatment). We imple-
mented a dummy in order to make the participation and no-participation
treatments comparable.
Let t1 and t2 be the proposals of taker 1 and taker 2 respectively. Let
t3 be the proposal of the responder (in the participation treatment) or the
dummy (in the no-participation treatment). The take rate is then determined
as t =
t1+t2+wt3
2+w . The weight w=(2 + w) of the responder's or the dummy's
proposal is either 1
3 for w = 1 (low-inuence treatment) or 1
2 for w = 2
(high-inuence treatment). This results in 2  2 = 4 treatment groups with
the mnemonic names PartLow, PartHigh, NoPartLow and NoPartHigh (see
table 1).
In the actual game, we restrict proposals to three possibilities, tj 2 T =
f1
3; 2




100g. The possible group take rates in the low-inuence treat-







high-inuence treatments, possible group take rates were restricted to the








12;1g. Note that T Low \ T High = T . For
t = 2
3, the group's endowment would be equally distributed among group
members, irrespective of d. Table 2 shows the possible take rates t.
Table 2: Possible group take rates t






















































































































112.2 Equilibria under maximization of expected exper-
imental payos
Assuming rationality and maximization of own expected experimental pay-
os, we can derive the subgame perfect equilibria of the game.12
Responders' behavior can be analyzed independently of the details of the
treatments. Responders should always propose the lowest take rate possible,
i.e., t3 = 1
3. The optimal destruction rate of the responder in stage 2 depends
on the take rate determined in stage 1. We describe their strategies by an n-
tupel of destruction rates d := (d1;d2;:::;dn) 2 Dn, where dj is the response
to group take rate tj, t1 < t2 < ::: < tn, and where the number n of
possible take rates and their values depend on the treatment. Maximizing
one's experimental payo as a responder means to destroy nothing if this is
costly (if t < 1), and to destroy any fraction of the pie if this is costless (if
t = 1). We denote these strategies by dx := (0;0;:::;0;x) with arbitrary
x 2 D.
Let us consider treatment PartLow rst. Given that t < 1 because of t3 =
1
3, the responder's choice among the strategies dx never matters. Moreover,
given that t < 1, the takers have no reason to play anything but t1 = t2 =
1. Hence, the subgame perfect equilibria are given by the strategy proles
(t1;t2;t3;d) = (1;1; 1
3;dx), x 2 D. The same reasoning, result, and notation
apply to treatment PartHigh, with the dierence that the set of possible
12On the implied assumption of risk neutrality, see the discussion in n. 15 below.
12take rates changes. Equilibria in the Part treatments are ecient because
the expected destruction rate is zero.
In the NoPart treatments, t1 = t2 = 1 results in a probability of 1
3 for the
event t = 1 (through t3 = 1). We rst consider NoPartLow. If t1 = t2 = 1,
three take rates are possible and occur with probability 1
3: t 2 f7
9; 8
9;1g. Since
the responder plays dx in the second stage, the expected payo of takers is







Destruction can be avoided if one of the takers chooses a take rate tj = 2
3,
which prevents t = 1.13 Again, three take rates are possible and occur with
probability 1
3: t 2 f6
9; 7
9; 8
9g. The expected payo of takers is




Note that taker payos depend on the group take rate, not on the individual
take rate, and are therefore identical for both takers.
The strategy proles (t1;t2;d) = (1;1;dx) on the one hand and (t1;t2;d) =
(2
3;1;dx) or (t1;t2;d) = (1; 2
3;dx) on the other hand lead to the same expected
payos for the takers i x = 1
3 (which cannot occur since x = 2 D). If x < 1
3,
the takers' expected payos are higher for t1 = t2 = 1; if x > 1
3, their payos
are higher if one of them chooses a take rate of 2
3.
Hence, if we restrict considerations to pure strategies, we nd two sets
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The rst set is (t1;t2;d) = (1;1;dx),
13In the absence of communication or repetition, of course, takers could coordinate on
asymmetric strategy choices only by chance.
13x 2 [0; 1
3] \ D. All these strategy proles have an expected destruction rate
of x
3 and are, therefore, inecient if x > 0. The second set is (t1;t2;d) 2
f(1; 2
3;dx);(2
3;1;dx)g, x 2 [1
3;1] \ D. These proles have a zero expected
destruction rate and are, therefore, ecient.
Analogous considerations apply to NoPartHigh. If t1 = t2 = 1, three take
rates are possible and occur with probability 1
3: t 2 f 8
12; 10
12;1g. Since the
responder plays dx in the second stage, the expected payo of takers is







If, however, one of the takers chooses a take rate tj = 2
3, the three equiprob-
able take rates are t 2 f 7
12; 9
12; 11
12g. The expected payo of takers, then,
is




If x = 1
4 2 D, takers' expected payos are the same in both cases. Hence, we
nd the following two sets of equilibria: (t1;t2;d) = (1;1;dx), x 2 [0; 1
4] \ D
and (t1;t2;d) 2 f(1; 2
3;dx);(2
3;1;dx)g, x 2 [1
4;1] \ D. Equilibria in the rst
set are inecient if x > 0. Equilibria in the second set are ecient.
Table 3 lists all subgame perfect pure strategy equilibria with (expected)
take rates, (expected) destruction rates and (expected) payos.
14Table 3: Subgame perfect pure strategy equilibria for all treatment groups
PartLow Equilibrium (t1;t2;t3;d) = (1;1; 1
3;dx);x 2 D
Group take rate 7
9
Expected destruction rate 0
Payos 1 = 2 = 7
18e;3 = 4
18e
PartHigh Equilibrium (t1;t2;t3;d) = (1;1; 1
3;dx);x 2 D
Group take rate 6
9
Expected destruction rate 0
Payos 1 = 2 = 3 = 1
3e
NoPartLow Equilibrium (t1;t2;d) = (1;1;dx);x 2 [0; 1
3] \ D
Group take rate 8
9
Expected destruction rate x
3
Payos 1 = 2 = 24 8x
54 e;3 = 3 x
27 e




Group take rate 7
9
Expected destruction rate 0
Payos 1 = 2 = 7
18e;3 = 2
9e
NoPartHigh Equilibrium (t1;t2;d) = (1;1;dx);x 2 [0; 1
4] \ D
Group take rate 10
12
Expected destruction rate x
3
Payos 1 = 2 = 15 5x
36 e;3 = 3 x
18 e




Group take rate 3
4
Expected destruction rate 0




In each experimental session, the following procedure was used. By ran-
domly assigning a seat number, each participant was assigned a role (taker
or responder) and was matched with two other participants whose identities
were never revealed. The instructions were read, followed by some role-
independent exercises intended to check participants' understanding of the
procedures. Participants then learned about their role and played the game
once. We framed the game as neutral as possible, avoiding any suggestive
terms.
In stage 1, takers and responder or dummy chose take rates tj 2 T . Ad-
ditionally, we asked responders to indicate their preferred group take rate
tpref 2 T . In stage 2, responders learnt about the take rate chosen by their
dummy (no-participation treatments) or were reminded of their own choice
(participation treatments). Thus, responders in all treatments received for-
mally the same information. However, as responders did not learn about
the take rates chosen by the takers, they did not know the group's actual
take rate t yet. Responders then had to choose their destruction rate d for
each feasible group take rate t (strategy method).14 At the end of stage
14Note that responders were asked to make a decision on the destruction rate for any t.
As responders knew at that time their own or the dummy's take rate choice, they might
have eliminated take rates no longer feasible. For instance, if a responder/dummy had
chosen t3 = 1, it follows that t  5
9 in the low treatments and t  2
3 in the high treatments.
Thus, choices on d(t) for small take rates were hypothetical. For the following analysis,
162, each participant learned about the take rate chosen by the group, the
corresponding destruction rate, and the resulting individual payo. There-
after, all participants lled in a post-experimental questionnaire concerning
preferences, expectations and social background.
Overall, 348 undergraduates from the introductory microeconomics course
at Saarland University participated in the experiment. Their elds of study
were business administration (81.3%), economic education science (10.6%),
business information management (3.2%), and other elds (4.8%). We had
54.6% male and 45.4% female participants. None of the participants had
participated in an economic research experiment before.
Participants formed 116 groups of three players. Thus, we collected data
from 232 takers and 116 responders. Each participant was assigned randomly
to one of the four treatments and each treatment was applied to 87 partic-
ipants (between-subject design). The experiment was computerized using
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We conducted twelve sessions, all on the same
day (3 sessions of 12 participants each, 1 session of 24 participants, 8 sessions
of 36 participants each).
Participants were paid in chips according to the decisions made. Every
earned chip was exchanged for a lottery ticket. Lottery tickets determined
participants' chance of winning the lottery prize of 500 Euro (binary lottery
we ignore this fact because, rst, we focus on treatment eects which are not touched by
these considerations, and second, main eects appear for high take rates and these are
feasible for most responders.
17mechanism). The lottery mechanism was carefully explained to the partici-
pants. In order to avoid tournament-type rewards, the number of tickets was
xed at 9 per group. In order to guarantee that one participant actually got
the prize, remaining tickets of group 1 were randomly distributed among the
members of group 2, remaining tickets of group 2 to group 3, and so on, with
the remaining tickets of the last group going to the participants of the rst
group.15
As a show-up fee, every participant received some extra points for the
compulsory introductory microeconomics exam. The experiment took about
25 minutes; thus, average earnings per hour were about 3.45 Euro. The
average earnings in chips were 1.75 for takers and 1.63 for responders (see
also table 4 for average earnings per treatment).
15For participants who maximize the expected utility of monetary payos, the binary
lottery mechanism implies risk neutrality. See Roth and Malouf (1979), Berg et al. (1986).
For a critical discussion of the mechanism, see Selten et al. (1999), for an experimental
test, see, e.g., Prasnikar (1998). However, risk considerations do not play an important
role in our context. We used the lottery mechanism mainly because we assumed that
the chance of winning a large prize would make participation in the experiment more
attractive. For the same reason, we wanted to make sure that the prize would actually go
to some participant. This required the redistribution of \destroyed" tickets as explained
in the text. Thus, the nal number of lottery tickets a participant received resulted from
two sources: earnings within the group, which provided the incentive to consider seriously
how to decide; and a possible windfall prot from unearned tickets from other groups,
which was unrelated to decision making within the participant's own group.
183 Results
Table 4 shows means, standard deviations (sd), and medians of take rate
proposals of takers (t1, t2) and of responders (t3), as well as of group take
rates preferred by responders (tpref), and of actual group take rates (t) for
each of the four treatments and overall treatments. Furthermore, average
earnings in chips for takers and responders are given. The last columns of
tables 5 and 6 (on pp. 26 and 27) provide a summary of destruction rate
data.
For all statistical tests, data from dierent treatments are independent
as we applied a between-subject design. Take rates and destruction rates
are measured on an interval scale. While we restrict choices to a small num-
ber of values, we might conjecture that hypothetical unrestricted choices
would come from a continuous distribution; thus, we might treat the data as
grouped data from a continuous distribution. Nevertheless, we cannot use
normality assumptions since take and destruction rates are restricted to the
unit interval; thus, approximating normality would only be possible with a
very small variance.16 For these reasons, we use only nonparametric tests.
16We have tested and rejected normality in all relevant cases with the help of the one-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
19Table 4: Take rates: overview
Variable Treatment
PartLow PartHigh NoPartLow NoPartHigh overall
t1, t2 mean 0.805 0.822 0.764 0.822 0.803
(sd) (0.188) (0.209) (0.234) (0.200) (0.208)
median 0.667 0.100 0.667 0.100 0.667
t3 mean 0.506 0.425 0.644 0.655 0.557
(sd) (0.211) (0.152) (0.266) (0.289) (0.252)
median 0.333 0.333 0.667 0.667 0.500
tpref mean 0.483 0.414 0.414 0.402 0.428
(sd) (0.191) (0.145) (0.145) (0.137) (0.157)
median 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333
t mean 0.728 0.632 0.747 0.750 0.714
(sd) (0.125) (0.103) (0.142) (0.151) (0.139)
median 0.777 0.583 0.778 0.750 0.667
mean earnings
takers 1.76 1.66 1.62 1.97 1.75
responders 1.55 2.14 1.52 1.31 1.63
203.1 Take rates
Although take rates are not immediately relevant to our purposes, we take
a closer look at them in order to exclude the possibility of freak results that
would shed doubt on the validity of our experimental procedures.
Takers' choices. Averaging over all treatments, the mean take rate pro-
posal of takers is 0.803. Remember that in our design, we have 2 takers and
1 responder forming a group. Thus, a take rate of about 80% means that
each taker claims on average about 40% of responders' endowment e, leaving
20% to the responder. This take rate is completely in line with the ndings
of Bosman et al. (2006), who report for a game with three takers and three
responders that takers claim on average 81% of the whole pie.17 Exactly the
same proportion has been found by Reuben and van Winden (2008), who
analyze a game with one taker and two responders, and nearly the same by
Sutter et al. (2003), who report data of a two-person game and found a mean
take rate of 78% of the whole pie. This number seems to be astonishingly
robust throughout dierent group sizes and group compositions despite the
fact that the overall take rate must by divided by the number of takers to
17In a standard power-to-take game, both sides, takers and responders, have an initial
endowment, with responders' endowment being at stake. Thus, the reported mean take
rate is not directly comparable to our result. Conversion based on the particular whole
pie is necessary.
21obtain the share claimed by the individual.18
The lowest take rate of 1
3 was chosen by only 7:3% of the takers, whereas
44:4% decided in favor of 2
3, and a narrow majority of 48:3% chose 1, which is
the most obvious equilibrium strategy. However, in the NoPart treatments,
a subgame perfect equilibrium can also be reached by one taker choosing
1 and the other taker choosing 2
3. This suggests that we might observe a
higher proportion of takers choosing 2
3 in the NoPart treatments than in
Part treatments. Actually, this is not the case: 43:1% of NoPart takers chose
2
3 (47:4%: 1; 9:5%: 1
3) whereas 45:7% of Part takers chose 2
3 (49:1%: 1; 5:2%:
1
3).
In order to evaluate whether takers take the applied decision rule into
account when choosing a take rate, we compare takers' take rate proposals
of the four treatments. For both high inuence treatments, take rates are on
average 0.822. For PartLow, the mean take rate is 0.805; for NoPartLow, it
is 0.764. The Kruskal-Wallis test nds no evidence that the take rates from
the four treatments come from dierent distributions (p = :491). A pairwise
comparison using the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test nds also no
signicant dierences between takers' take rate choices (all six p-values above
.186).
Low treatments allow for equal inuence of all decision makers (2 takers
and 1 responder/dummy), whereas High treatments privilege the respon-
18This robustness is even more surprising when taking into account that we restricted
take rate proposals to three possibilities, tj 2 f1
3; 2
3;1g:
22der/dummy. As this fact might cause takers to worry about the level of the
resulting take rate, we tested the directional hypothesis that take rates of tak-
ers are higher in High than in Low treatments. We nd a weakly signicant
dierence between the pooled data of Low and High treatments using a one-
sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p = :085). This eect seems to result
mainly from a weakly signicant dierence between the NoPart treatments
(NoPartLow vs NoPartHigh: p = :102, PartLow vs PartHigh: p = :251).
Take rate proposals of responders. Take rates chosen by responders
(PartLow and PartHigh) and generated with the help of pseudo-random num-
bers (NoPartLow and NoPartHigh) are labeled as variable t3. The mean take
rate for PartLow was 0:506, for PartHigh only 0:425. The average take rate of
all responders was 0:466. Dummy mean take rates were 0:644 (NoPartLow)
and 0:655 (NoPartHigh). The overall average was 0:557. The Kruskal-Wallis
test shows a highly signicant dierence between all four groups (p = :001),
thus providing evidence that not all samples came from the same distribu-
tion. This is not surprising since we used a uniform distribution for dummy
take rate proposals in the NoPart-treatments; it just shows that responder
proposals were not uniformly distributed.
By comparing PartLow with NoPartLow, we can also show that respon-
ders' choices are signicantly dierent from dummys' take rate proposals
(two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p = :002). The same is true for
High treatments (p = :043).
23As responders in the PartLow treatment might try to compensate their
low level of inuence (although they do not know that another treatment ex-
ists), the mean take rate for PartLow is expected to be higher than the mean
take rate for PartHigh. In fact, average take rate proposals in the PartLow
treatment are signicantly higher (one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,
p = :068).
Responders' preferred group take rates. Most responders (72:4%) re-
ported that they preferred a group take rate of 1
3, which is the lowest possible
take rate and maximizes their own experimental payo. Almost all the others
(26:7%) stated that their preferred group take rate was 2
3, which leads to an
equal distribution of the pie. Only one participant (0:9%) stated a preferred
group take rate of 1. The average preferred take rate is 0:428, the median
is 1
3. PartLow responders prefer the highest take rate on average (0.483),
whereas NoPartHigh responders show the lowest mean (0.402). The average
preferred group take rates of the other two treatments are slightly higher
(both average take rates are 0.414).
The median is 1
3 for all treatments; not surprisingly, then, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the median is the same in all four treatments
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p = :254). A pairwise comparison of average preferred
take rates in the four treatments shows no signicant dierence except for
PartLow versus NoPartHigh (two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p =
:082).
243.2 Destruction rates: aggregate results
The mean destruction rate in response to the actual group take rates was
0.294. This is slightly higher than the value of 0.208 observed by Bosman et
al. (2006) and Hennig-Schmidt and Geng (2005). Of 116 responders, 81.9%
used the possibility of destroying part of the pie. The average destruction
rate is 0.289 over all choices. If the take rate is smaller than 1, destroying
part of the pie is costly; nevertheless, 71.6% of responders destroy even in
this case, with an average destruction rate of 0.234. This is in accordance
with the common observation that people are prepared to punish even if
punishment is costly to themselves.
However, 30.2% of the responders destroy part of the pie even if the take
rate is at its minimum of 1
3, although the average destruction rate of 0.095 is
lowest in this case. This is in accordance with the observation that rejections
in restricted ultimatum games occur even when the proposer cannot make a
better oer (Falk et al. 2008). Even when the take rate is 2
3, which implies
equal shares of the pie for all and is seen to be the fair take rate by an
overwhelming majority of 78.4% of all participants (t = 1
3: 17.2%; t = 1:
4.3%), the average destruction rate is 0.216.
Nevertheless, cost considerations seem to be important for punishment.
The average destruction rate for take rates over 2
3 but below 1 is 0.384; at a
take rate of 1, where punishment is costless, the destruction rate jumps to
0.662. Obviously, average destruction rates increase with increasing group
25take rates.
Table 5 highlights proportions of responders classied by their destruction
rate choice for any take rate. Average destruction rates for various take rates
are reported in the last column of table 6.
Table 5: Responders' destruction rate choices (in %) for dierent take rates
0 < 0:1 < 0:2 < 0:3 < 0:4 < 0:5 < 0:6 < 0:7 < 0:8 < 0:9 <
d = 0 d d d d d d d d d d d = 1
 0:1  0:2  0:3  0:4  0:5  0:6  0:7  0:8  0:9 < 1
t = 3
9 69.8 6.9 6.9 4.3 1.7 6.0 0.9 3.4 0 0 0 0
3
9 < t < 6
9 44.8 14.7 10.3 7.8 11.2 6.9 3.4 0.9 0 0 0 0
t = 6
9 48.3 2.6 7.8 5.2 12.9 11.2 5.2 2.6 3.4 0 0 0.9
6
9 < t < 1 30.2 2.6 9.5 4.3 6.0 10.3 6.9 12.1 7.8 5.2 0 5.2
t = 1 25.0 1.7 0.9 0 1.7 8.6 0.9 0 3.4 0.9 1.7 55.2
3
9  t  1 43.6 5.7 7.1 4.3 6.7 8.6 3.5 3.8 2.9 1.2 0.3 12.3
Let us now tackle the related question whether there is a correlation
between the levels of destruction and take rates. Hennig-Schmidt and Geng
(2005) found that the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected at
p = :05, indicating a positive correlation (Spearman's  = :57). In our
data, the correlation is substantially smaller but more signicant (Spearman's
 = :23, p = :006).
26Table 6: Destruction rates: overview
treatment
PartLow PartHigh NoPartLow NoPartHigh overall
dt with t = 3
9 average 0.109 0.059 0.118 0.093 0.095
(sd) (0.186) (0.143) (0.204) (0.193) (0.182)
dt with 3
9 < t < 6
9 average 0.136 0.119 0.150 0.179 0.146
(sd) (0.186) (0.164) (0.200) (0.187) (0.184)
dt with t = 6
9 average 0.218 0.210 0.219 0.218 0.216
(sd) (0.235) (0.256) (0.275) (0.264) (0.255)
dt with 6
9 < t < 1 average 0.343 0.406 0.384 0.404 0.384
(sd) (0.295) (0.352) (0.355) (0.335) (0.333)
dt with t = 1 average 0.597 0.610 0.749 0.690 0.662
(sd) (0.433) (0.446) (0.411) (0.452) (0.435)
dt with 3
9  t  1 average 0.269 0.273 0.308 0.305 0.289
dt with 3
9  t < 1 average 0.214 0.231 0.234 0.257 0.234
273.3 Destruction rates: treatment eects
A rst analysis of destruction rate data shows almost no evidence in favor of
our hypothesis that participation diminishes negative reciprocity.
Table 6 shows destruction rate choices for dierent take rates and for all
treatment groups. Possible take rates dier between the High and Low treat-
ments. In order to allow for a comparison, data are therefore grouped into ve
categories: d(t = 3
9);d(3
9 < t < 6
9);d(t = 6
9);d(6
9 < t < 1);d(t = 1). We now
consider the eects of participation and strength of inuence on destruction
rates. Since we hypothesized directional eects of participation and strength
of inuence on destruction rates, we apply one-sided tests throughout.
A visual inspection suggests that the distribution of destruction rates in
each treatment group is similar in shape. We used the Kruskal-Wallis test
to compare the four groups of data, nding that, for each take rate category,
destruction rates do not dier signicantly between the treatment groups.19
The picture does not change much when we look at pairwise comparisons
of the four groups. First, we test whether observations on d(t) in the PartLow
treatment are smaller than in the NoPartLow treatment. Comparing average
destruction rates of both treatments, we nd that, for all take rates t 2
T Low [T High common to both treatments, d(t) is higher in NoPartLow than
in PartLow. However, according to the one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney,
these dierences are not signicant: all p-values are clearly higher than .05
19The smallest signicance level p = :181 is found for d(t = 1).
28except for d(t = 1), where p = 0:054.20
When we look at the dierences between PartHigh and NoPartHigh, we
get similar results. Average destruction rates are higher in NoPartHigh than
in PartHigh for any feasible take rate t (with the exception of d(t = 3
4): mean
destruction is 0.361 for PartHigh and 0.277 for NoPartHigh). According
to the one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, none of the dierences is
signicant.
There is also no signicant eect of the strength of inuence. When
comparing PartLow and PartHigh or, less interestingly, NoPartLow and
NoPartHigh, the smallest p-value is p = :78, associated with d(t = 1
3) in
PartLow and PartHigh. There is even no evidence that strength of inuence
has any directional eect: for some t, destruction rates are higher in the Low
treatments; for other t, destruction rates are lower in the Low treatments.
Since destruction rates from High and Low treatments do not dier in
medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) nor in the distribution of values
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), we have also pooled the data in two groups, Part
(PartLow and PartHigh) and NoPart (NoPartLow and NoPartHigh). Again,
we found mean destruction rates to be higher in NoPart than in Part, which
we expected. Whereas the dierence is positive for any d(t), it ranges from
20The test uses ranks and assumes that the scores come from a continuous distribution,
where the probability of ties is zero. With discrete data, ties may occur, which happened
in our case. In such cases, each of the tied observations is given the ranks they would
have had if no ties had occurred. For our data, the proportion of ties is quite large and
occurred between observations involving both groups. We applied the correction for ties.
29very small (0.0074 for d(t = 6
9)) to relative large (0.1167 for d(t = 1)), with
the other values in the range from 0.0189 to 0.0364. However, none of the
dierences is signicant according to the one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test: the smallest p-value is 0.55 for d(t = 1). There is also no signicant
dierence when we analyze destruction rates for any feasible group take rate
t instead of destruction rate categories.
3.4 Destruction rates: responder types
We found that average destruction rates increase with increasing group take
rates but do not dier signicantly among the treatments. Thus, we nd
negative reciprocity on average but no treatment eects. However, averages
may mask substantial heterogeneity in individual behavior. Non-reciprocal
responder types are not inuenced by our treatments. If these types are
frequent enough, treatment eects on reciprocal types may not show up in
the aggregate.
In accordance with other experimental studies, we distinguish four types
of responders: the homo oeconomicus (type 0), the unconditional cooperator
(type 1), the homo reciprocans (type 2), and the erratic type (type 3). This
classication of responder behavior is not ad hoc. It is known from other
experiments that types 0 and 1 occur, although their behavior is untypical
for average human behavior in many situations. Type 2 behavior covers the
kind of negative reciprocity we observe, on average, in basic power-to-take
games.
30Type 3 is the most problematic type. It is known from many experiments
that there are almost always participants who are confused or not motivated
to decide carefully. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the
group of type 3 responders contains participants who have understood the
instructions and decided carefully but just had aims we failed to understand.
These types dier in terms of their responder behavior, which we describe,
as before, by an n-tupel of destruction rates (d1;d2;:::;dn) 2 Dn, where dj
is the type's response to take rate tj, t1 < t2 < ::: < tn, and where the
number n of possible take rates and their values depend on the treatment.
Specically, we consider the following strategies:
 d0 := (0;:::0) (never destroy)
 d+ := (0;0;:::0;x) with x > 0, x 2 D (destroy i this is costless)
 d++ := (d1;d2;:::;dn) with d1  d2  :::  dn and dn 1 > 0 (nonde-
creasing, destroy in spite of costs)
 d  := (d1;d2;:::;dn) with dj+1 < dj for at least one j (nonmonotonic)
According to the type denitions, types play only certain strategies. Type
0 maximizes its experimental payo, which implies d0 or d+. Type 1 is always
cooperative and therefore plays d0. Type 2 shows (negative) reciprocity, that
is, plays d+ or d++. Type 3 may play any strategy; however, if there is a
strong random inuence on the behavior of type 3, it will most likely play
d , because this is the largest class of strategies.
31Table 7: Responder types
Treatment
PartLow PartHigh NoPartLow NoPartHigh Total
Type 0/1 8 7 7 7 29
(6.9%) (6.0%) (6.0%) (6.0%) (25.0%)
Type 2 15 18 13 14 60
(12.9%) (15.5%) (11.2%) (12.1%) (51.7%)
Type 3 6 4 9 8 27
(5.2%) (3.4%) (7.8%) (6.9%) (23.3%)
Hence, we can tentatively classify types on account of their behavior. We
classify users of d0 and d+ as type 0/1, users of d  as type 3, and users of d++
as type 2. We then validate this classication by looking at some relevant
statistics.
On the basis of this classication, table 7 lists the observed frequency of
the three responder types by treatments and over all treatments. Overall,
type 2 responders constitute the majority (slightly above 50%), while 25%
of the responders are of type 0/1 and the rest (not quite 25%) is of type 3.
The distribution of types over treatment groups does not dier signicantly
from a uniform distribution (chi-square test, p = :781). Thus, types seem to
be exogenous, which supports our type classication.
Destruction decisions also dier substantially among these types. Median
destruction rates of type 0/1, type 2, and type 3 players are signicantly
32dierent for any possible group take rate smaller than 1 (p < :001, three-
sample Median test).21 Thus, types dier not only in their strategy choices
but also in their reactions to each group take rate below 1. This is not
implied by the type denition and suggests that our types are really dierent.
A pairwise comparison of destruction choices of type 0/1 with type 2 as
well as with type 3 yields the expected results: for any take rate t < 1,
type 0/1 responders destroy signicantly less (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,
one-sided, p < :004). Even more interesting results provides a comparison
between type 2 and type 3 responders. Type 2 players destroy less than type
3 responders on average when confronted with t  5
9 and more as reaction
to t > 5
9. For some small and some high take rates, destruction decisions
are signicantly dierent, for others (especially medium take rates), they
are not (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided), but there seems to be no
meaningful pattern.
Moreover, types dier with regard to the correlation between take rate
and destruction rate. As already explained, we found a signicantly positive
correlation in the aggregate. For type 0/1 responders, we nd, trivially, a pos-
itive and signicant correlation (Spearman's  = :312, p = :050 one-sided),
whereas for type 3 responders, we nd a negative, non-signicant correlation
(Spearman's  =  :175, p = :384 two-sided). For type 2 responders, the
correlation between take and destruction rate is positive by denition of the
21For t = 1, the Median test could not be performed because their were no cases above
the median.
33type, large, and highly signicant (Spearman's  = :697, p < :001 one-sided).
The hypothesis that participatory decision making reduces negative reci-
procity concerns only the reciprocal type 2; thus, we focus on type 2 respon-
ders, who also form a clear majority. Table 8 provides the following data for
type 2 responder behavior in Part and NoPart treatments: number of type
2 responders (n)22, mean destruction rate and standard deviation (sd).
For low and medium take rates (t  9
12), we observe no clear-cut ef-
fect concerning mean destruction rates between both treatments. However,
for t > 9
12, mean destruction rates of responders in the NoPart treatments
clearly exceed destruction rates in the Part treatments. This is in line
with the hypothesis that responders allowed to participate in the decision-
making process destroy smaller shares of the pie than NoPart-responders.
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (one-sided) shows that mean destruction
rates of Part-responders are signicantly lower than of NoPart-responders for
t = 8
9 (p = :026), t = 11
12 (p = :044), and t = 1 (p = :021). The last column
of table 8 provides the corresponding p-values (one-sided) for any possible
group take rate t.
Thus, we nd that participation matters for type 2 responders. For low
and medium group takes rates (t  9
12), the destruction rates do not dier
signicantly between Part and NoPart treatments (p  :151).
22Number of responders dier within the Part and NoPart treatments because some
group take rates are only possible in either the High or Low treatments while others are
possible in both.
34Table 8: Destruction rates of type 2 responders
Treatment
Part NoPart
Take rate n mean sd n mean sd p
t = 3
9 33 0.054 0.117 27 0.042 0.118 .151
t = 5
12 18 0.077 0.143 14 0.120 0.134 .155
t = 4
9 15 0.125 0.149 13 0.077 0.155 .152
t = 6
12 18 0.156 0.181 14 0.207 0.197 .241
t = 5
9 15 0.182 0.184 13 0.165 0.189 .379
t = 7
12 18 0.222 0.244 14 0.283 0.240 .261
t = 6
9 33 0.314 0.247 27 0.319 0.266 .485
t = 9
12 18 0.478 0.332 14 0.468 0.285 .500
t = 7
9 15 0.452 0.238 13 0.532 0.311 .266
t = 10
12 18 0.534 0.311 14 0.567 0.315 .380
t = 8
9 15 0.626 0.212 13 0.784 0.184 .026
t = 11
12 18 0.657 0.300 14 0.835 0.202 .044
t = 1 33 0.824 0.273 27 0.960 0.137 .021
35However, for high group take rates (t > 9
12), destruction rates in Part are
signicantly lower than destruction rates in NoPart (p  :044). Pooling
data for t = 8
9 and t = 11
12 (which both result from the same action prole
(t1;t2;t3) = (1;1; 2
3) and dier only in the weight of t3 due to treatment
variation) yields a highly signicant dierence (p = :0005).
We do not nd, however, that there is a signicant dierence in type 2
responder behavior between PartLow and PartHigh. The smallest p-value
is p = :259, associated with d(t = 1
3) (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, one-
sided). Nevertheless, strength of inuence seems to have a directional eect:
for any t being feasible in both treatments (i.e. t 2 f1
3; 2
3;1g), destruction
rates are lower in PartHigh.
4 Conclusion
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on procedural aspects
of decision making. The literature shows that an individual's willingness
to accept unfavorable decisions, without resorting to negatively reciprocal
behavior like punishment or revenge, may depend on the perceived fairness
of the decision procedure. We have focused on a specic aspect of procedural
fairness, namely, participation. In our experiment, participation does indeed
increase acceptance of unfavorable decisions for the majority of participants
who show reciprocal behavior. Participatory decision making had no eects
36in the case of moderately unfavorable decisions, but there were signicant
eects in the case of highly unfavorable decisions.
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